Add cloudpickle to pickle blacklists (B403/B301)#1462
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cloudpickle extends pickle's serialization to arbitrary Python objects, so deserializing untrusted cloudpickle data is an arbitrary-code-execution risk, exactly like pickle/dill. bandit already flags pickle, cPickle, dill, shelve, jsonpickle and pandas.read_pickle but not cloudpickle. - B403: add 'cloudpickle' to the flagged imports. - B301: add cloudpickle.loads / cloudpickle.load / cloudpickle.Unpickler to the flagged calls. - Add examples/cloudpickle.py and a functional test mirroring the dill case (1 LOW import + 3 MEDIUM calls, all HIGH confidence). Closes PyCQA#1236.
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July 23, 2026 21:45
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Closes #1236.
What
cloudpickleextendspickleto serialize arbitrary Python objects (lambdas, closures, dynamically-defined classes). That makes deserializing untrusted cloudpickle data an arbitrary-code-execution risk, exactly likepickleanddill— but bandit's pickle blacklists didn't cover it, while they already coverpickle,cPickle,dill,shelve,jsonpickleandpandas.read_pickle.Changes
import_pickle): addcloudpickleto the flagged imports.pickle): addcloudpickle.loads,cloudpickle.load,cloudpickle.Unpicklerto the flagged calls.examples/cloudpickle.py(mirroringexamples/dill.py) and atest_cloudpicklefunctional test.Verification
Findings match the
dillcase exactly — 1 LOW import + 3 MEDIUM calls, all HIGH confidence.test_cloudpicklepasses and the full functional suite is green (80 passed) with no regressions.