Summary
On Linux kernels that do not support Landlock network rules, nono_py.sandboxed_exec() could run CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy) without supervising the seccomp-notify proxy-only fallback returned by the Rust core.
In that configuration, a sandboxed child process could remove HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY environment variables or use raw sockets and then open direct TCP connections that should have been denied by proxy-only policy.
The issue affects proxy-only enforcement. It does not mean that all nono-py network blocking is ineffective. ECS validation showed caps.block_network() denied regular TCP and ECS metadata TCP on the tested Linux 6.1 host.
Impact
The intended proxy_only() security property is:
- child processes may connect only to the local nono proxy port
- the proxy enforces host allowlists and metadata/link-local denial
- direct TCP to any other target is denied
Before the fix, on kernels without Landlock AccessNet, the Python binding applied the sandbox and then executed the child, but did not install and supervise the proxy-only seccomp-notify fallback. A child could therefore bypass the proxy layer in that old-kernel path.
The highest-impact scenario is a sandboxed workload with access to cloud metadata discovery inputs, where direct TCP to a metadata endpoint could retrieve task or instance credentials after proxy environment variables are removed.
Affected Conditions
The issue requires all of the following:
- Linux runtime.
- Kernel without Landlock network support, such as Linux 6.1. Landlock network rules require Landlock ABI v4 / Linux 6.7 or newer.
nono_py.sandboxed_exec() is used.- The capability set uses
caps.proxy_only(proxy).
- The child process removes or ignores proxy environment variables, or uses raw sockets.
macOS Seatbelt proxy-only enforcement is not affected by this Linux seccomp-notify fallback issue.
Affected Versions
Known affected builds include nono-py versions that expose and use CapabilitySet.proxy_only() through sandboxed_exec() before the supervised fallback fix in this working tree.
Earlier versions that did not expose CapabilitySet.proxy_only() are not affected by this specific proxy-only enforcement bug, though they may have separate environment-inheritance risks if callers passed broad parent environment variables into sandboxed children.
CVSS Score Rationale
| Metric |
Value |
Rationale |
| Attack Vector (AV) |
L — Local |
Exploit is performed by a local process (unsetting env vars or opening raw sockets). Not remotely triggerable. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) |
H — High |
All of the following must be true: Linux runtime; kernel < 6.7 (no Landlock ABI v4); sandboxed_exec() used; capability set calls proxy_only(); child actively bypasses proxy env vars or uses raw sockets. |
| Privileges Required (PR) |
L — Low |
Attacker is already executing code inside the sandbox — some user-level privilege is required to get there. |
| User Interaction (UI) |
N — None |
No action from a user or operator is needed once the sandboxed child is running. |
| Scope (S) |
C — Changed |
The exploit crosses the sandbox security boundary, allowing the child to reach network resources outside the defined policy scope. |
| Confidentiality (C) |
H — High |
Highest-impact path: direct TCP to cloud metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254) yields IAM / task credentials. |
| Integrity (I) |
L — Low |
Attacker can make arbitrary outbound requests; no direct data modification from the bypass itself, but lateral credential use creates indirect risk. |
| Availability (A) |
N — None |
No denial-of-service impact described or implied. |
References
lukehinds Reporter
Summary
On Linux kernels that do not support Landlock network rules,
nono_py.sandboxed_exec()could runCapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy)without supervising the seccomp-notify proxy-only fallback returned by the Rust core.In that configuration, a sandboxed child process could remove
HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXYenvironment variables or use raw sockets and then open direct TCP connections that should have been denied by proxy-only policy.The issue affects proxy-only enforcement. It does not mean that all nono-py network blocking is ineffective. ECS validation showed
caps.block_network()denied regular TCP and ECS metadata TCP on the tested Linux 6.1 host.Impact
The intended
proxy_only()security property is:Before the fix, on kernels without Landlock
AccessNet, the Python binding applied the sandbox and then executed the child, but did not install and supervise the proxy-only seccomp-notify fallback. A child could therefore bypass the proxy layer in that old-kernel path.The highest-impact scenario is a sandboxed workload with access to cloud metadata discovery inputs, where direct TCP to a metadata endpoint could retrieve task or instance credentials after proxy environment variables are removed.
Affected Conditions
The issue requires all of the following:
nono_py.sandboxed_exec()is used.caps.proxy_only(proxy).macOS Seatbelt proxy-only enforcement is not affected by this Linux seccomp-notify fallback issue.
Affected Versions
Known affected builds include nono-py versions that expose and use
CapabilitySet.proxy_only()throughsandboxed_exec()before the supervised fallback fix in this working tree.Earlier versions that did not expose
CapabilitySet.proxy_only()are not affected by this specific proxy-only enforcement bug, though they may have separate environment-inheritance risks if callers passed broad parent environment variables into sandboxed children.CVSS Score Rationale
sandboxed_exec()used; capability set callsproxy_only(); child actively bypasses proxy env vars or uses raw sockets.References